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I begin with expressions of both thanks and regret. First, my
gratitude to Professor Barker for including me once again in this
seminar, which has become a biannual event. The international
focus of these seminars has set them apart from any other symposia I am aware of in Western Pennsylvania, and the quality of the
presenters-with the exception of the immediate incumbent of the
podium-has assured thoughtful and expert presentations. Bob
Barker deserves our hearty congratulations.
As for the expression of regrets, I was very sorry to miss last
evening's event. By coincidence, a biannual convocation of United
States Appeals Court judges is taking place in Washington-the
only occasion that my colleagues throughout the country have to
meet collegially every two years. In an effort to keep commitments to both Bob Barker and the federal judiciary, I attended
yesterday's sessions in Washington, but I will miss them today so
that I may participate in this unique international exchange between judges and legal academics.

*

Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. This text was

delivered as part of the symposium Separationof Powers in the Americas . . . and Beyond:
An InternationalSeminar for United States Lawyers at the Duquesne University School of
Law in November 2008. The author expresses his gratitude to Kimberly L. Herb and Judith C. Gallagher for their invaluable contributions to the preparation of these remarks.
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Dean Guter has observed in his written welcome to all participants and attendees, "[t]he separation of powers is a topic that is
particularly ripe for discussion in this era of global terrorism."1 I
do not disagree. What I would say is that the topic is always ripe,
whatever the season, and no matter what party or faction happens
to be regnant at the time. A discussion of "separation," however
we define it, will always be animated by the views that citizens in
a democracy have concerning the most pressing policy issues of
the day. And the manifestations of "separation"-the countervailing impulses toward political hegemony and institutional deference-play out in every age. I begin, in a very traditional way,
with the early stirrings in our own budding democracy.
I. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS
The Federalist Papers first appeared as a series of essays published in New York newspapers between October 1787 and August
1788. The purpose of those essays was to explain to would-be voters in the new American Republic their proposed Constitution, its
structure, and its motivating principles. The immediate goal, of
course, was to influence the ratification of the Constitution. The
Founders also understood their role at a pivotal moment in history, and we have a sound basis to believe that they intended The
FederalistPapers to provide us with guidance for our continuing
interpretation of constitutional issues.
In the first paper of this series, Alexander Hamilton proposed to
discuss such topics as the "utility of the union to your political
prosperity"; the "conformity of the proposed constitution to the
true principles of a republican government"; and the "additional
security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that
species of government, to liberty, and to property." 2 Our discussion today implicates all of those concerns, as separation of powers-namely, distinct legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government-was thought to be the "essential precaution in
3
favor of liberty."
Separation of powers principles derive from a profound distrust
of government power. In FederalistNo. 51, James Madison wrote:

1. Duquesne University School of Law, Separation of Powers in the Americas... and
Beyond:
An International Seminar for United States Lawyers 4, available at
http://www.law.duq.edu/pdf/separationofpowers08.pdf.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 297 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has taught
4
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
These "auxiliary precautions" are woven throughout the Constitution in the form of specific, enumerated powers for each branch
and yet, at the same time, a symbiotic relationship between all
three.
In fact, separation of powers is a bit of a misnomer. While, as I
mentioned, there are distinct roles for each branch of government,
James Madison argued that the experience of the colonies proved
that "parchment barriers"-the specific powers granted to each
branch in the Constitution-were "greatly overrated" as a check
on encroachments of power. 5 Thus, the concept of separation of
powers actually embodies two distinct notions: (1) enumerated
powers and (2) a sufficient "connect[ion] and blend[ing] as to give
to each a constitutional control over the others. ' 6 It is as much
about balance and interdependence as about separation.

II. APPROACHES TO SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES
Before discussing the American experience in more detail, let
me say a few words about how courts approach and consider separation of powers issues. One of the first complexities encountered
in a discussion of separation of powers is that there are varying
approaches to questions about whether the doctrine has been violated, namely, whether a particular branch of government is acting within its range of powers or is intruding into another
branch's sphere. 7 One approach has been called the "functional"
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id.
See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) ('The Supreme
Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to separation-ofpowers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of
government.., and a functional approach that stresses core function and relationship, and
permits a good deal of flexibility[.]").
4.
5.
6.
7.
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approach. 8 This method is not concerned with whether one branch
is performing an act committed to its sphere of power, but it is
instead primarily concerned with whether the action taken is so
disruptive to the constitutional scheme that the action impairs the
other branches from exercising their constitutionally delegated
power. 9 It is a more deferential, case-by-case approach that essentially looks to whether the particular action poses a serious disruption to the separation of powers. As such, the "functional" approach has been criticized as antithetical to the "prophylactic
structure adopted by the Framers." 10
A second approach is known as the "formal" approach. 1' This
approach takes a strict view of separation of powers; it is, technically, a definitional approach. One characterizes the action in
question as judicial, legislative, or executive and then looks at
which branch is performing the action. 12 A reviewing court must
then determine whether it is constitutional for that actor to perform that action. One of our current Supreme Court justices, Justice Scalia, is a well-known proponent of this approach.' 3 In contrast to the pragmatic approach, the formal approach rejects caseby-case analysis of whether some actions intrude "too much" "for
the simple reason that there is no effective method of making that
inquiry-at least until it is too late to avoid the danger."' 4
Having established that our legal scholars disagree on how to
approach the principle of separation of powers-shocking as that
may be to you-the balance of my discussion focuses on the jockey-

8. Id.
9. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) ("[Iln
reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has
been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action
will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.")
10. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern The Need for
PragmaticFormalism in Separationof Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 465 (1991).
11. Strauss, supra note 7, at 489.
12. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 10, at 454. The authors argue:
[Tihe Court's role in separation of powers cases should be limited to determining
whether the challenged branch action falls within the definition of that branch's constitutionally derived powers-executive, legislative, or judicial. If the answer is yes,
the branch's action is constitutional; if the answer is no, the action is unconstitutional.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The
Court has, nonetheless, replaced the clear constitutional prescription that the executive
power belongs to the President with a 'balancing test.'. . . Once we depart from the text of
the Constitution, just where short of that do we stop?").
14. Redish & Cisar, supra note 10, at 465.
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ing for position and the friction that it inevitably produces within
our system.

III. THEORY INTO PRACTICE-THE CONSTITUTION AND
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL TENSION

While the notion of "separation of powers" was a driving force
behind the Constitution, it is notable that the words themselves
are not found in the text of our Constitution. That is because our
federal government is structured around the concept; our Constitution as a whole manifests this principle by giving shape to that
government. Article I vests in Congress specific powers, such as
the ability to write and enact laws, raise taxes, and declare war;
yet it also requires that Congress engage in the affairs of the other
branches-Congress creates lower federal courts and has the
power to impeach the president and offers a check on Congress in
the form of presidential presentment before a bill can become
law. 15 Likewise, Article II gives the president the power to conduct war, make treaties, and pardon. 16 Once again, the Constitution gives the executive a role in the other departments by giving
the president the power to appoint judges1 7 and the authority to
execute enacted laws' 8 while, concurrently, Article II also makes
the executive accountable to the other branches by requiring confirmation of the president's candidates for officers, judges, and
ambassadors of the United States' 9 and establishing the impeachment process for judges and the president. 20 Finally, Article
III maintains a similar structure: it confers all the judicial power
in the Supreme Court, 2 1 but it gives Congress the authority to create lower courts 22 and make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 23 Each branch, therefore, has a defined role, and
yet each branch must coexist, often interdependently, with the
others and find balance.
Such a form of government certainly comes with a cost: ongoing
tension. No branch of government is institutionally inclined to
cede authority-or even influence-to another. Supreme Court
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7-8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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Justice Louis Brandeis once said that the purpose of the doctrine
of separation of powers "was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy. ' 24 Just as the routine workings of democracy can
be unattractive to observe, so too can the institutionalized friction
of separation at work give evidence not only to tension but to occasional hostility. Let me give you some examples of the cases in
which these tensions are manifest.
A.

Checks on the Legislative Branch

First, a number of cases arise out of the actions of the legislative
branch. For instance, the Constitution prohibits Congress from
passing what are called Bills of Attainder. 25 Bills of Attainder are
legislative acts prescribing punishment, without a trial, for a specific person or group. 26 In United States v. Brown,27 the Supreme
Court struck down a federal law that prevented members of the
Communist Party from serving as officers in labor unions. 28 The
Court boldly noted that the Framers were more concerned about
the legislature exceeding its authority than the executive. 29 The
Court then stated that the "Legislative Branch is not so well
suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of
ruling upon the blameworthiness 0 of, and levying appropriate
'30
punishment upon, specific persons.
There are also a number of examples of legislative encroachment on the role of the executive. For example, Article I of the
Constitution requires that all legislation, before it can become law,
is subject to bicameralism and presentment. 31 Bicameralism requires that all legislation be approved by both the House and the

24.

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

25.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.

26. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (stating that the Bill of Attainder Clause was an outgrowth of separation of powers and a "general safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legislature").
27. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
28. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 461-62.
29. See id. at 444 (stating that, in a republican form of government, "barriers had to be
erected to ensure that the legislature would not overstep the bounds of its authority and
perform the functions of the other departments).
30. Id. at 445.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Both requirements derive from the same provision:
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it becomes a Law be presented to the President of the United States." Id.
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Senate. 32 Presentment requires the president to approve the legislation (subject to an override by Congress) before the bill can become law. 33 These provisions were implicated in the context of
immigration when Congress gave the Attorney General, an officer
of the executive branch, the authority to suspend the deportation
of certain aliens in cases of extreme hardship. 34 The law, however,
not only gave power but also took it away-it provided that either
the House or Senate alone could override the decision of the Attorney General in a particular case. 35 Applying separation of powers principles (although not deciding the case on separation of
powers grounds), the Court declared the provision unconstitutional as a congressional usurpation of executive power. 36 The
Court reasoned that the "legislative veto" in the case essentially
allowed Congress to control an executive agency's discretion in
carrying out the laws. 37 A veto by either chamber of Congress allowed Congress to override the Attorney General's discretion. 38
This construct was an impermissible encroachment by the legisla39
tive branch on the executive's power.
Another case arose out of the passage of the Brady Handgun
Violence Protection Act, 40 and again, the Supreme Court invoked
the doctrine of separation of powers. 41 The Act required state and
local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on
individuals seeking to purchase a handgun. 42 The Court struck
down the law, noting first that the Founders "rejected the concept
of a central government that would act upon and through the
States."4 3 Equally problematic, however, the Court declared that
the law impermissibly interfered with the separation between the
branches. It stated, "The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress," and

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-24 (1983) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)).
35. See Chadha,462 U.S. at 923-24 (discussing the operation of the statute).
36. Id. at 959.
37. Id. at 955 ("Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation
is legislatively altered or revoked.").
38. Id.
39. Id. at 956 ("[The veto provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch.").
40. Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), invalidated in part by Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), codified in present form at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22.
41. Printz, 521 U.S. 898.
42. See id. at 902-03 (discussing the Brady Act).
43-

Td- qt 9 19 -
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found that the Brady Act circumvented this commitment of power
44
to the executive branch by seeking to transfer it to the states.
Although these cases demonstrate the first part of the separation of powers doctrine-namely, the idea of distinct, enumerated
powers, and the efforts made to preserve those powers-the fact
that these issues arise in court cases, duly referred to and decided
by the judiciary, speaks volumes about the second aspect of the
doctrine and the necessary coexistence between the branches. The
judiciary has played an important role-from Marbury v. Madison,45 when the Court declared that "[i]t is emphatically the prov46
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"
up to today-in the legislature's exercise of its authority. A good
example of this law-defining role is the nondelegation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, Congress cannot wholly delegate its legislative power to the executive branch. 47 If a delegation is so wide in
scope that it enables the executive to exercise unfettered discretion regarding legal obligations and standards, it is invalid. 48 The
judicial branch, rather than the legislature, is called upon to
monitor and police questions of delegation.
For instance, Congress passed a law in 1934 that enabled the
president to establish "a code of fair competition," which was predominately aimed at setting wage and hour requirements for the
live poultry industry. 49 The code would be administered through
an industry advisory committee selected by trade associations and
members of the industry, and the president was authorized to approve the code if he believed that it effectuated congressional intent. 50 The Supreme Court struck down Congress's law because it
gave the executive branch limitless authority to define fair competition. 51 While the courts have not frequently struck down laws
under this doctrine, cases have come before the Court on a fair

44. Id. at 922.
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
46. Marbury,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
47. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government.").
48. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7 (1989) (stating that the Court
had struck down laws where Congress "failed to articulate any policy or standard that
would serve to confine the discretion of the authorities to whom Congress had delegated
power").
49. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1935)
(describing the enabling legislation).
50. A.L.A. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-23.
51. Id. at 541-42.
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number of occasions, demonstrating the interplay between the
branches necessary to ensure the proper functioning of each.
B.

Checks on the Executive Branch

While there are many cases regarding legislative encroachment
on executive power, the reverse has also been an issue. One famous case is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.52 During
the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of
this country's steel mills to avert a strike by steelworkers. 53 The
Court considered whether the President had the authority to do
this. Justice Black, writing for the majority, concluded that he did
not. The president is limited to acting under the direction of either a constitutional provision or a law; because President Truman had neither, the order was invalid.5 4 Interestingly, and further illuminating the tensions that the separation of powers doctrine presents, the majority decision in the Youngstown case was
qualified by separate concurring opinions of five other members of
the Court, making it difficult to determine the precise limits of the
president's power to seize private property in emergencies. For
example, Justice Frankfurter would have held that congressional
silence is not determinative. 55 Justice Jackson took what is now
referred to as a legislative-accountability approach. His view
would allow the president to take any action not prohibited by the
56
Constitution or by federal statute.
Another compelling issue implicating separation of powers principles, which has caused tension throughout history, is the concept
of executive privileges and immunities. Executive privilege is
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and it
exempts the executive branch of the federal government from certain disclosure requirements. 57 Basically, it refers to the ability of
the president to keep conversations with, or memoranda to or
from, advisors a secret. The Constitution does not explicitly create
such a privilege, but it has been invoked throughout history52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
53. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
54. Id. at 585-89.
55. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility."). Id.
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1005 (8th ed. 2005).
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most frequently in the context of the need for candor between the
president and his advisors on issues of national security.
Executive privilege is most famously associated (and, unfortunately, notoriously so) with the Watergate scandal of the Nixon
Administration and was met head-on by the Supreme Court in the
case of United States v. Nixon.58 A special prosecutor was appointed to investigate an indictment charging seven individuals
with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to obstruct justice. The prosecutor sought audiotapes
of conversations recorded by then-President Nixon in the Oval Office. 59 Nixon refused to turn over the tapes, claiming executive
privilege. In fact, he declared: "Under the doctrine of separation
of powers, the manner in which the president personally exercises
his assigned executive powers is not subject to questioning by another branch of government." The Supreme Court took up the issue to decide whether the president's ability to claim executive
privilege really was immune from judicial review. The Court answered in the negative and made three points. First, it concluded
that it is the role of the Court to decide whether the president may
properly invoke executive privilege, and if so, what the scope of
6°
that privilege is.
The Court cited to Marbury v. Madison for the
Court's authority to decide what the law is.61 Second, the Court
recognized the existence of executive privilege as an inherent
presidential power in spite of the fact that Article II does not expressly grant this power to the president. 62 Finally, the Court concluded that executive privilege is not absolute, but rather it must
yield when there are important countervailing interests. 63 Ultimately, the Court concluded that "the fundamental demands of
due process of law in the fair administration of justice" demanded
that President Nixon obey the subpoena and produce the tapes
and documents. 64 Nixon, of course, resigned shortly after the release of the tapes. Once again, though, this case demonstrates
that separation of powers is not just about maintaining the dis-

58. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
59. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 686-87.
60. Id. at 703.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 705-06 ("Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated
powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar
constitutional underpinnings.").
63. Id. at 707 ("[W]e conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may
outweigh Presidential privilege[.]").
64. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
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tinct powers of each branch. Separation of powers presumes the
occasional involvement of each branch in the affairs of the others
to bring balance and accountability.

C.

Checks on the Judiciary

Much of my discussion has focused on Supreme Court cases. As
a member of the judiciary, I admit to a certain bias that almost
deterministically informs my focus. Certainly, the courts play a
significant role in defining the nature and scope of the separation
of powers doctrine. Yet, I do not wish for you to think that my
view-the view of a federal appeals judge-of our constitutional
structure is a myopic one. There are substantial limits on the
courts as well, to prevent encroachment on the purview of the
other branches. Admittedly, though, those limits are not as explicit, arguably because of the Founders' belief-expressed by
Alexander Hamilton-that "the judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights
of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy
or injure them. '65 Nonetheless, those limits do exist. For instance, the Constitution limits the judicial function as extending
only to "cases" and "controversies."' 66 In a self-limiting jurisprudential exercise, courts have maintained two doctrines related to
the "cases" and "controversies" requirement in the name of separation of powers, namely the political question doctrine and advisory opinions.
Under the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court has
held that certain claims should not be ruled on by the federal
courts, despite the existence of jurisdiction and justiciability requirements. 6 7 Courts, in considering whether a case presents a
political question, usually will examine several considerations,
including whether (1) the Constitution has committed decisionmaking on the subject to a coordinate branch of the federal government; (2) there are adequate standards for the court to apply in
considering the matter; and (3) it would be prudent for the court to
interfere. 68 If one or all of those considerations are present, the
court may decline to consider the matter. Justifications cited in
support of this doctrine are (a) that it is sometimes better for the
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
67. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
68. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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courts to avoid deciding certain cases so as to preserve the judiciary's political legitimacy; (b) it allocates decisions to the branches
of government that have superior expertise in particular areas, for
example, foreign policy; (c) there are some instances where the
federal courts' self-interest disqualifies them from ruling on certain matters, for example, the process of ratifying constitutional
amendments because that is the process by which Supreme Court
rulings are overturned; and (d) it minimizes judicial intrusion into
69
the operations of the other branches of government.
As an example of some issues that arise under the political
question doctrine, let me discuss another Nixon-not President
Nixon, but a federal district court judge by that name. The House
impeached Judge Nixon after he was convicted of perjury. 70 The
matter was then referred to the Senate, which appointed a committee to hear the evidence against Nixon and report to the chamber as a whole. 7 1 Judge Nixon challenged this rule, arguing that
the Constitution guaranteed him an evidentiary hearing and trial
before the full Senate, not just a committee.7 2 The Supreme Court
declined to take this route, ruling that the issue presented a political question.7 3 It concluded that opening the door to consider
the Senate's impeachment procedures and proceedings would "expose the political life of the country to months, perhaps years of
chaos." 74 Moreover, the Court stated that judicial review of impeachments would be inconsistent with the Framers' views of impeachment in the scheme of separation of powers. The Framers
saw impeachment as a legislative check on the judiciary; judicial
75
involvement would undercut this independent check on judges.
Another self-imposed limit on the authority of courts relates to
advisory opinions. These are opinions issued by the courts on the
legality of an executive or legislative action, but they do not involve an actual case or concrete set of facts. 76 The Supreme Court
69. But cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 706-10 (reviewing cases involving the political question
doctrine and the various rationales offered to support its application).
70. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
71. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 227.
72. Id. at 228.
73. Id. at 228-38.
74. Id. at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 234-35 ("[J]udicial review would be inconsistent with the Framers' insistence
that our system be one of checks and balances. In our constitutional system, impeachment
was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature.').
76. See, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) ('The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory
opinions on abstract propositions of law.").
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has repeatedly prohibited such opinions. 77 The reason is quite
clear: the judicial role is limited to deciding actual disputes; it
does not include giving advice to the Congress or to the president
on what is legal and what is not.
Returning to the idea of the interplay and entanglement of the
branches, the judiciary also cannot act alone. The coordinate
branches, and particularly Congress, have a substantial role in
checking the judiciary. For instance, Article I gives Congress the
power to create all lower federal courts, as well as to determine
the jurisdiction of those courts. 7 In fact, the lower federal courts
did not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving federal questions
until 1875. 79 Furthermore, the Constitution appears to give Congress the power to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Article III states that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."80 It is the
"with such Exceptions" language that seems to allow for the legislative branch to defeat the Court's substantive rulings by prohibiting the Court from hearing and deciding certain cases. This practice is known as "jurisdiction stripping."8'
Proponents of jurisdiction stripping argue that the language
means just that. They claim that the language is unambiguous in
its authorization of Congress to make "such Exceptions"; they
claim that the Framers intended this authority as a check on the
power of the federal judiciary.8 2 Others, however, argue that the
"Exceptions" refer to "facts," and thus, Congress is limited to restricting the fact-finding ability of the Supreme Court.8 3 Still others argue that if Congress were to withdraw the Supreme Court's
ability to hear certain cases, such an action would be unconstitu-

77. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004) ("[The giving of advisory
opinions-not just advisory opinions on particular questions but all advisory opinions,
presumably even those concerning legislation affecting the Judiciary-was beyond [the
Supreme Court's] power.").
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
79. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) ("Federal
courts, after all, did not have general federal-question jurisdiction until 1875.").
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
81. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (discussing the statutory
clause in question as a jurisdiction-stripping provision).
82. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) ("[T]he power to make exceptions to
the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.").
83. See Julian Velasco, Congressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 720-21 (1997) (discussing this argument, though concluding that it is incorrect).
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tional under other provisions.8 4 In 1868, in the case of Ex parte
McCardle,8 5 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitutional provision may allow for a political restraint on its jurisdiction, when the Court refused to hear a case on the ground that a
federal statute enacted by Congress took the Court's jurisdiction
away from the issue.8 6 Since that time, some limits have been
87
placed on McCardle and Congress's jurisdiction-stripping power.
But, the underlying tension remains alive and well today.
Additionally, although the judicial power is vested in the courts,
Congress can still play a role in interpreting the law through the
constitutional amendment process. A constitutional amendment
requires a two-thirds vote of Congress followed by the approval of
three-quarters of the states (or two-thirds of the states by constitutional convention).8 8 Every year, members of Congress propose
a number of constitutional amendments on issues that have arisen
in the course of judicial review, including some recently that relate
to school prayer, the definition of marriage, and the death pen89
alty.
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Having discussed the tensions that arise between the coordinate
branches of government, I want to return to the Founders. Separation of powers was not an end, but a means to achieving peace,
stability, and a government free of tyranny. After more than two
centuries of experimentation, the question becomes whether the
structure and purpose of government works as the Founders intended. Our discussion today will certainly shed some light on
that. By discussing the experience of countries throughout the
84. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 393 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that a law that would deprive courts of judicial review of some Selective
Service Board decisions "would raise serious constitutional problems").
85. ExparteMcCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
86. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
87. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) ("[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear ....
We require this heightened showing in part to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that
would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim.").
88.

U.S. CONST. art. V.

89. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 6, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing an amendment relating to
school prayer); H.J. Res. 37, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing an amendment relating to marriage); H.J. Res. 51, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing an amendment that would permit the
death penalty for the rape of a child).
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world, I hope we can better understand what we do well and
where we can improve. I want to bring a few of my own personal
reflections to bear on this topic.
I am a great believer in the notion of public virtue-a form of
self-sacrifice and dedication to duty that, when apparent to a citizenry, can bolster its faith in a nation's institutions and its confidence in the propriety of the actions of its government. This principle guided the Founders. They repeatedly stressed the importance of virtue, not only in our leaders, but in all citizens, as a
necessary precondition for self-governance. The Founders also
recognized, however, that there must exist "auxiliary" precautions
to check against the exercise of self-interest by a few, which could
result in the oppression of many.
In recent years, I have traveled abroad and worked with judges,
predominately in Eastern Europe, on rule-of-law issues. I am
driven by the notion that a sense of public virtue must animate
the work of judges everywhere, but I have also recognized that it
is a fragile commodity. In the absence of checks and balances, the
natural expression of public virtue can be thwarted by the selfinterested. I have met judges who lack life tenure and who depend on the executive or legislature for both their tenure and salary. These seemingly modest differences in governmental structure can permeate every aspect of a system. Not only can it affect
the adjudication and vindication of individual rights and liberties
as the law is applied arbitrarily, but also the legislative and executive branches can act more hastily and opportunistically without fear of accountability. While I do not labor under the illusion
that the American system is perfect or that we should export
wholesale to other countries our system of judicial review, I am
thankful that I have the ability to rule based on the law as I know
it, to review government conduct, and to provide a remedy where
that conduct is wrongful-powers that might well be denied without life tenure and salary protection.
Second, I have begun to reflect on this issue in light of the times
in which we live. As our hosts noted in the printed announcement
of this seminar, times of war can test the separation of powers
doctrine. Most frequently, tension arises between the executive,
who has the power to conduct war, and the legislature, which has
the power to declare war. We have witnessed this tension over the
past few years, as former President George W. Bush broadly interpreted his war powers and members of Congress fought back
and sought to manage the deployment and withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Iraq. Again, these tensions are not new. Congress

702

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

made similar efforts to influence the conduct of war during the
War of 1812, the war with Mexico, and the Civil War. 90 While
there is often friction between the political branches in times of
war, we need to look no further than our recent experience to see
that tensions arise with the judiciary as well; with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005,91 Congress sought to prevent courts from
hearing the cases of individuals detained in the wars in Iraq and
92
Afghanistan.
First, we must distinguish between the means to effectuate
more balance and the will to do so. Although it has not done so,
for reasons that could range from acquiescence to agreement,
there is little doubt that Congress could constitutionally use its
power of the purse to necessitate a troop withdrawal. This inaction complicates the inquiry into the effectiveness of our system of
checks and balances during times of war: How do you redistribute
power when the imbalance is due, in part, to the reluctance of one
branch to assert its power? We could, of course, alter the structure and require the president to obtain congressional approval
prior to military action. But this comes with a number of costs,
not least of which is the speed with which our nation is able to
respond to emergencies.
It could be that Congress has not invoked its appropriation
power because it views a troop withdrawal as too drastic, by which
I mean politically unpalatable. This brings me to my second point,
which is that Congress may wish to consider other options if it
does not want to acquiesce completely. As I mentioned previously,
members of Congress have introduced a number of proposals related to the Iraq war, ranging from the elimination of funding, to a
phased withdrawal of troops, to the imposition of specific training
and equipment standards for deployments. There have also been
a number of hearings, including some specifically on balance-ofpower issues. Once again, there may be reason to question the
likelihood that such seemingly innocuous actions by Congress will
prompt the executive to change course, but I think it is arguable

90. Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed., In Wartime, Who Has the Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007,
at § 4, at 1 (stating that during the War of 1812, congressional critics of President Madison
forced the resignation of his Secretary of War; that the House censured President Polk for
"unconstitutionally beginning a war with Mexico;" and that, during the Civil War, members
of Congress sought to fire General McClellan in order to prosecute the war more aggressively).
91. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
92. Id. § 1005.
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that the dialogue alone forces the president to be more accountable than he would be otherwise.
Finally, it should be evident that the courts continue to exercise
their role in vindicating the rights of individuals, even when issues of war powers are at stake. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 93 the
Supreme Court considered the Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA")
and concluded that, under ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, the Act did not strip the jurisdiction of the Court to hear
cases pending before Congress passed the Act. 94 Congress responded by passing the Military Commission Act, which amended
the DTA to deny federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
actions that were pending at the time of its enactment. 95 In a second case following on the heels of this law, the Court construed
the constitutionality of this Act. In the case of Boumediene v.
Bush,96 the Court acknowledged that the Military Commissions
Act did, in fact, deprive federal courts of the opportunity to hear
requests for writs of habeas corpus filed by detainees. 97 Nonetheless, the Court struck down the law as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.98 In so doing, the Court discussed the very
topic that brings us here today. It stated:
Our opinion does not undermine the Executive's powers as
Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those
powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch. Within the Constitution's separation-of-powers
structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or
as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the
authority of the Executive to imprison a person. 99
These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has not abdicated its role in our constitutional structure to determine "what
the law is." Nor do they suggest, in my view, a judicial branch
that is complicit in a migration of power to the executive. But
later generations will have a much better perspective from which
to decide whether the courts have effectively exercised their con-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575-76.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244.
Id. at 2274.
Id. at 2277.
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stitutional authority in a manner that both maintains separation
and prevents an undue consolidation of presidential power.
V. SEPARATION OF POWER IN THE STATES

In closing, while it might seem beyond the scope of today's discussion, I would be remiss if I did not note the existence of separation-of-powers issues at the level of our fifty states. The vitality of
our federalism compels me to advert at least briefly to the experience of those states.
The Constitution places only one real limit on the form state
governments may take or the distribution of powers within state
governments: the Guarantee Clause. This Clause provides that
"[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence."' 100 The Supreme Court, however, has held that
this Clause and the question of how states organize themselves is
a political question and is not justiciable. 1° 1 Of course, this holding does not mean that states are entirely unregulated. The federal government must guarantee that a state's form of government
is republican, and, with federal courts out of the picture, it is Congress's job to interpret what that means. 0 2 Congress has not yet

chosen to do

so. 103

Ultimately, then, state constitutions define how state governments are to be formed and how various governmental powers
should be exercised. Often, their powers are not separated in the
same way as power is constitutionally dispersed at the federal
level. For example, state constitutions often give the judicial
branch a much broader role in government than that possessed by
the federal judicial branch. 104 Yet, 40 state constitutions contain

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl.1.
101. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (stating that questions related
to the authority and "republican character" of state governments are ones to be decided by
Congress and "not in the courts"). But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-32 (1962) (narrowing the nonjusticiability of Guarantee-Clause cases).
102. Marcia L. McCormick, When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of State Institutional Competence, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1167, 1206 (2007).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1195.
100.
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clauses that explicitly call for separation of powers. 0 5 This stands
in contrast to the fact that words of separation are not found in
our federal Constitution. Should we take this to mean that-at
the state level-the doctrine really is about separateness rather
than a balance and interplay between the branches? I think not.
James Madison discussed this very thing in The FederalistPapers:
"[N]otwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the
unqualified terms in which this axiom [of separation of powers]
has been laid down [in the constitutions of the several States],
there is not a single instance in which the several departments of
10 6
power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct."'
VI. CONCLUSION

I conclude with the realization that I have done little more than
describe what seems to be a dynamic process. Is it possible, in the
absence of explicit constitutional text, to define the limits of separation? And if we fail to do so, do we invite incursions by one
branch into the proper sphere of another? To what extent can the
constitutional roles of the three branches be impacted by majoritarian influences, if at all? I sincerely hope that I do not seem glib
when I observe that, far removed from what we do in the courts,
both public opinion and national elections which give voice to a
sovereign people have their own unique way of balancing things
out. I thank Professor Barker and our hosts at Duquesne for their
invitation and for permitting me the opportunity for this kind of
reflection.

105. James W. Doggett, Note, "Trickle Down" Constitutional Interpretation: Should
Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing be Imported into State Constitutional
Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (2008).
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

